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Chapter 11
Safety Culture in a Complex Mix
of Safety Models: Are We Missing
the Point?
Corinne Bieder
Abstract Safety culture is often considered as being the role given to safety in the
trade-offs made within an organization. But what is the scope of these trade-offs? If
operational activities at the sharp end are naturally included in the safety culture
perimeter, other trade-offs are made that structure operational activities, especially
through the development of processes, procedures, organizational structure and
policies but also through technological choices. These trade-offs are made within
the environment of the organization, and that inevitably induces constraints on the
role given to safety, as there are already trade-offs inherited from this environment.
Likewise, a variety of safety models exist in this environment, in the sense of
assumptions or beliefs as to how safety is ensured or more often is to be ensured.
Eventually, each organization combines a mix of safety models, some partly
conflicting with others. To what extent is an organization aware of the complexity
of operations and of what it takes to operate safely? Is this also part of its safety
culture? To what extent and how can this complexity be addressed? These are some
of the questions addressed in the paper.
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1 Introduction
Safety culture as introduced in the early 90s was focused on the importance of the
role given to safety compared to other stakes within organizations. Since then, it has
been considered a major factor in a safe performance and still receives significant
attention in both proactive and reactive safety management. However, it seems that
the concept is more commonly used for activities having an obvious and direct
impact on operational activities whereas more structuring support functions fall
outside of the natural scope of safety culture. Their influence on operational
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activities may be less direct, but is nevertheless significant. Safety culture with its
current scope may then become a proxy and prevent a deeper analysis of what
actually contributes to safety, especially the high-level decisions sometimes con-
sidered rather simplistically as being business decisions only.
Nevertheless, the importance of the role given to safety in trade-offs, whatever
the scope of trade-offs considered, may not be the only missing ingredient. Indeed,
organizations operate in a context that partly constrains their choices, including the
structuring ones, and not only in the role given to safety but also in the way safe
performance can be achieved. Eventually, each organization combines a mix of
“inherited safety models” throughout its environment, from the authority, its
competitors, suppliers… Operating safely or safely enough with this mix of safety
models, which are not necessarily consistent with one another, involves not only to
give safety an adequate priority but also to navigate the associated complexity.
2 Safety Culture as an Essential Ingredient: The Final
Touch or Incorporated All Along?
Safety culture as introduced and defined by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA, 1991),
“that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which
establishes that, as an overriding priority, [nuclear power] safety issues receive attention
warranted by their significance”,
was considered at that time to be the missing ingredient to ensure safety. While
other complementary ingredients have been identified since then, following the
occurrence of accidents, safety culture often remains an area for improvement on
the agenda of many industries. Many definitions have been proposed to try to
address the issue, some rather prescriptive, others more descriptive as explained in
Chap. 12. If we adopt a descriptive perspective, safety culture can be considered the
role or weight given to safety in the trade-offs made within an organization. Yet the
scope of the decisions and trade-offs considered is not so obvious. Operational
activities at the sharp end are naturally considered within the safety culture
perimeter, but what about other activities not directly related to real-time operations
such as support functions or high-level managerial decisions? Is safety given
sufficient attention in Human Resources policies and decisions or in Procurement
policies and decisions?
If we refer to the practical definition of culture proposed by Bower (1966), “the
way we do things around here”, who does “we” refer to, and what “things” are
considered? If normative views of safety culture tend to encompass all the
employees of an organization as in safety culture surveys such as that of
Eurocontrol (Mearns et al., 2009), descriptive views seem to focus on operators and
first-line management, leaving out a whole range of employees and trade-offs not
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directly involved in real-time operations. Yet, some of these trade-offs and resulting
decisions are structuring for the organization and its performance, including the
safety performance (Amalberti, 2015; Schein, 2010). A merger or acquisition
decision or a transformation of the industrial set-up through increased subcon-
tracting, for example, or a decision to buy new technological devices or new
information and management tools are decisions that may significantly impact
safety. These decisions, often considered business decisions (as if safety had
nothing to do with them, and thus with business), seem to fall outside of the “safety
culture” scope despite their role on safety.
Likewise, rules and processes already embed some trade-offs between safety and
other business objectives. Whether safety is given sufficient attention in these
trade-offs that structure the activities of the organization is not naturally or sys-
tematically examined. The intuitive scope of safety culture does not include
structuring activities not directly related to real-time operations despite their strong
remote influence on them, and thus on safety. For example, a significant number of
airlines prescribe in their operations manual to put the autopilot on above 500 or
1000 ft and disconnect it when reaching below this threshold again. Although this
rule has an obvious efficiency objective—minimizing the fuel burn or optimizing
the use of systems, the impact on safety can be debatable, especially if we consider
the long-term impacts on pilots’ manual flying skills.
Similarly, the safety impact of new types of pilots’ contracts (e.g. pay-to-fly)
may not have been analyzed as extensively as their economic impact, without
prejudging the conclusions.
In many hazardous activities, some of the structuring choices made at some point
in time are later analyzed in terms of their consequences on safety. It is the case of
the increasing reliance on subcontractors or of mergers, for example. In the nuclear
industry, a specific expert investigation was launched by the French Nuclear Safety
Authority (ASN) in 2013 to “examine the efficiency of the measures taken by EDF
(Electricité de France) to facilitate the priority given to nuclear safety in the
interactions between EDF and the sub-contractor” (ASN, 2013) or of some mergers.
In the airline industry, the recent merger between two airlines was mentioned in
several accident investigation reports as a factor that may have played a role
(Commission of Inquiry into the Air Ontario Crash at Dryden, Ontario (Canada),
1992). Interestingly, while these aspects are analyzed after an accident, thus
identified a posteriori as having possibly played a role in the accident, they are still
considered a priori “business decisions” and made with limited safety considera-
tions, if any. Yet they involve trade-offs made by the organization… Should the
concept of safety culture be broadened to include these kinds of structuring
trade-offs? Should they be addressed through a different set of concepts and
methods? Sociology of organizations certainly includes part of these questions in its
scope.
Yet, a remaining question is: would taking safety into account in all these
trade-offs solve all the problems?
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3 Is the Solution as Simple as Deciding to Incorporate
an Additional Ingredient?
Considering that safety culture in the sense of giving safety sufficient (if not
overriding) attention/priority in the trade-offs made by the organization will make
all the difference assumes that operating safely is totally in the hands of the
organization and that the organization has all the settings to do so. It further
assumes that the organization is totally free of its choices and that the problem lies
in the lack of internal consistency regarding the attention given to safety. In reality,
the situation is complex and the challenges are huge, not only internally but also
externally.
Internally, safety models may already vary from one organizational level to the
next, one site to another or from one professional culture to another (Carroll, 1998),
translating into different approaches to uncertainty management thus to different
control mechanisms and eventually requirements (Grote, 2015). An illustration of
this variability is the scope of activities that are proceduralized and the philosophy
of the rules leaving more or less leeway to those supposed to implement them
(Bieder & Bourrier, 2013). Indeed, they reflect the assumptions and beliefs as to
what makes operations safe.
In addition, an organization operates in an external environment that not only
influences some of its trade-offs but also conveys a mix of perspectives on how
safety is to be ensured and ultimately leads to a certain complexity in ensuring safe
performance, even if safety is given an appropriate role. A well-known example is
the safety regulation(s) the organization has to comply with. Any regulation relies
on a safety model in the sense of a set of assumptions or beliefs as to what is needed
to ensure safe performance. The regulatory framework thereby imposes a safety
model on the organization, constraining some of its choices related to how to ensure
safety. This constraint applies whatever the attention given to safety.
Somewhat less obviously, the organization is also constrained by a number of
other aspects that include a safety model the organization has very little leeway to
negotiate or adapt.
The technological devices used by the organization but not developed in-house
also reflect one or more safety model(s). The design of an aircraft or of a control
room relies on a number of assumptions as to how safety works (or what is needed
to ensure safe operations) that preside over design choices made by the technology
designers and manufacturers. These choices are also guided by some assumptions
regarding trade-offs between safety and productivity or other business dimensions.
A technological device may even reflect several safety models depending on the
operational context and conditions. It is the case of degraded modes of automation
like in aircraft design for example. The underlying assumptions as to what will
ensure that the flight is safe are different, in particular as to the respective roles of
the aircraft and the pilots, in normal or degraded modes of automation. The
diversity of safety models embodied by the aircraft itself put different requirements
on the flight crew depending on the situation. The reality is even more complex.
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Indeed, the same technological device may integrate several underlying safety
model(s) by combining technologies coming from different sources (e.g. suppliers)
that themselves reflect trade-offs between safety and other business objectives. For
example, a supplier may favor standardization and thereby adopt a generic
“one-size-fits-all” underlying safety model in the design choices fitted for this
purpose. In the case of aircraft design, a supplier may provide the same system to
several aircraft manufacturers with very limited customization, if any. Eventually,
the choice of one technology against another is not neutral in terms of the safety
model(s) and trade-offs that it implicitly conveys. One can argue that an airline has
the freedom to choose the aircraft and partly the aircraft systems suppliers but
anyway, the choice is limited and the leeway remains small.
At this level of detail, the contradictions and inconsistencies appear quite
obviously. Nevertheless, there is no point hoping to achieve perfect consistency
between all these models. These contradictions are not the sign of an inappropriate
way of thinking or of failures of organizations but just a manifestation of the
complexity of reality (Morin, 2007). There is no point attempting to reduce them
all.
Ultimately, whatever the role given to safety in trade-offs, each organization
embeds a mix of safety models that are not necessarily consistent, without even
being aware of it. This variety of safety models imposes a set of partly conflicting
requirements onto employees at all levels, meaning that “operating safely or safely
enough” is not just a matter of safety oriented trade-offs but involves a certain
complexity to navigate inconsistencies.
4 Conclusion
Safety culture tends to focus on operations, excluding from its scope trade-offs and
decisions that have a structuring and lasting impact on the conditions under which
operations take place. Yet, some of these high-level decisions and trade-offs gen-
erate inconsistencies “designed” into the organization and its resources that safety
culture alone cannot overcome. Could the role given to safety in these higher-level
decisions come under an extension of the safety culture concept or is another set of
concepts needed from sociology of organizations, management or other disciplines?
Whatever the answer, it would most probably contribute to reducing evitable
complexity.
However, it is vain to imagine that this complexity, partly due to the coexisting
mix of safety models in an organization, can be totally eliminated. An organization
operates in an environment that partly constrains its leeway and generates some
inconsistencies in the requirements to operate safely or safely enough.
In fact, the situation is even more complex at the macro level. Safety is one
aspect among others that needs to be managed by organizations. If the concept of
safety culture was introduced to make sure that it was not under-considered/
overlooked compared to others (e.g. productivity, security, financial benefits…), the
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issue is that of acceptable or globally reasonable trade-offs between the various
stakes, rather than protecting a specific one, possibly to the detriment of others,
even when this is safety.
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